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CASENOTE
IMMIGRATION LAW-Exclusionary Rule-If the Exclusion-
ary Rule Question Is Reached, the Civil Nature of a Deportation
Proceeding May Preclude Its Application. Cuevas-Ortega v.
Immigration and Naturalization Service, 588 F.2d 1274 (9th Cir.
1979).
In May, 1976, an Immigration and Naturalization Service
("INS") investigator and an inspector from the San Mateo District
Attorney's office knocked on the apartment door of Josephina Del
Toro-Mendoza.' The INS agent and the inspector were investigating
possible immigration fraud in San Mateo County.2 When Del Toro
answered the door, the two men identified themselves. Del Toro
spoke with them over the threshold.3 At first, they asked questions
about a Mexican family living in the same apartment complex.
Then they asked if Del Toro herself was born in Mexico and if she
was in the United States illegally. Del Toro answered "yes" to both
questions and then permitted the investigators to enter her apart-
ment.' She admitted that her husband and children were also illegal
aliens.5 The INS investigator then instructed Del Toro to come to
the INS office with her husband and various identification docu-
ments.
Del Toro and her husband, Rafael Cuevas-Ortega, reported to the
INS office. They admitted, after questioning, that Cuevas-Ortega
had Del Toro and their children smuggled into the United States in
September, 1974.1 The admissions were "contemporaneously re-
corded on two 1-213 forms."7
At the subsequent deportation hearing, when Del Toro and
Cuevas-Ortega refused to testify,8 the 1-213 forms were introduced
to show Del Toro's and Cuevas-Ortega's deportability. They were
1. Cuevas-Ortega v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 588 F.2d 1274, 1276 (9th
Cir. 1979).
2. The INS and the San Mateo County District Attorney's Office were investigating
"possible fraudulent home birth registrations by resident aliens." Id. at 1275-76.
3. Id. at 1276.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id. An 1-213 Form is also known as a Record of a Deportable Alien.
8. Id. Petitioners did so on advice of counsel.
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. VII
received in evidence, despite the petitioners' attorney's objections
that the statements on the forms "were the 'fruits' of an illegal
search and seizure at the initial apartment meeting."I The immigra-
tion judge found the petitioners deportable as illegal aliens and
denied their request for voluntary departure.'9 The Board of Immi-
gration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the finding of deportability and
denial of voluntary departure."
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the BIA.' 2 It held
that no illegal search and seizure violative of the fourth amend-
ment'3 had occurred during the initial questioning of Del Toro at her
apartment, since "[s]he willingly spoke with the investigators both
at her door and once they were inside."" The court further stated
that "[t]here was no arrest, custody or curtailment of liberty"' 5 and
that the statements made by the petitioners at the INS office were
voluntary and, therefore, not unlawfully obtained.'" Having decided
that no fourth amendment violation had occurred, the Cuevas-
Ortega court rejected the petitioners' argument that the evidence
used in the deportation proceedings was "fruit" of an illegal search
and seizure."
Finally, the court found that the immigration judge had not
abused his discretion in denying the petitioners' request for volun-
9. Id.
10. Id. The immigration judge also refused to allow further questioning of the INS investi-
gator.
Petitioners had requested voluntary departure in the alternative. The immigration judge
denied their request because Del Toro and the children had been smuggled into the United
States and Cuevas-Ortega had an arrest record. Id.
If an illegal alien plans to reapply for admission to the United States after he has physically
departed, it is important to apply for voluntary departure and to avoid deportation. Under
section 1182(a)(17) of Title 8 of the United States Code, an alien who is arrested and deported
is ineligible to receive a visa and is excluded from admission into the United States unless a
special waiver is given by the Attorney General. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(17) (1976).
11. 588 F.2d at 1275.
12. Id.
13. The fourth amendment of the United States Constitution provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particu-
larly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
14. 588 F.2d at 1277.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 1278.
17. Id.
CASE NOTE
tary departure because the petitioners did not meet their burden of
proof.' 8 To be eligible for voluntary departure, an alien must affirm-
atively establish his good moral character.'" Cuevas-Ortega and Del
Toro did not introduce anything to show such eligibility and conse-
quently, the denial of their application was not arbitrary or capri-
cious. 20
Although the petitioners had raised an exclusionary rule argu-
ment in their appeal, the Cuevas-Ortega court declined to discuss
the issue." Yet the court's analysis could have gone further. It did
in the original slip opinion.2
In May, 1978, the Cuevas-Ortega court held, in its slip opinion,
that even if a fourth amendment violation had occurred, it would
"decline to invoke the exclusionary rule . . . because the deporta-
tion proceeding was not one subject to its application. '2 The ration-
ale of the court was that the exclusionary rule only applies to crimi-
nal proceedings and not to deportation proceedings which are civil
in nature. 4 The court essentially concluded that "[s]ince neither
criminal procedures nor sanctions are involved in deportation pro-
ceedings, the exclusionary rule is not here appropriate. ' '2 5 Eight
months later, on January 2, 1979, the court amended its slip opin-
ion, omitting the discussion of the exclusionary rule 2 and deciding
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Cuevas-Ortega v. INS, No. 74-329, slip op. (9th Cir. May 3, 1978) [hereinafter cited
as Cuevas-Ortega, slip op.].
23. Id. at 6.
24. Id. at 7.
25. Id.
26. Section IV of the May 3, 1978 slip opinion reads as follows:
Petitioners contend that the evidence which established their deportability is ex-
cludable as the "fruit" of an illegal search and seizure. Even if we did not reject the
contention that no fourth amendment violation occurred, we would decline to invoke
the exclusionary rule in this case because the deportation proceeding was not one
subject to its application.
The exclusionary rule is a judicially created remedy designed to safeguard fourth
amendment rights through its deterrent effect on future unlawful police conduct. Stone
v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 484 (1976); United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 443-47 (1976);
United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347-48 (1974). It is not a personal constitu-
tional right of an aggrieved party. Nor does the rule proscribe the use of illegal evidence
in all proceedings or against all persons. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. at 486-89; United
States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. at 348. The rationale for excluding evidence is strongest
where the Government's unlawful conduct would result in the imposition of criminal
1979]
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that the issue did not have to be reached.27
The use of the exclusionary rule in deportation proceedings is an
issue that has been raised in many immigration appeals. The courts,
however, are not in agreement on whether or how this issue should
be decided. The decision of the Ninth Circuit, had it followed its slip
opinion in Cuevas-Ortega, would have been in direct conflict with
the recent holdings of the First Circuit, which has allowed the appli-
cation of the exclusionary rule in deportation proceedings. The
Cuevas-Ortega slip opinion presented a point of view which could
have been a rational alternative to the First Circuit. This Casenote
will discuss the "Cuevas-Ortega alternative" as advanced by the
Ninth Circuit in its original slip opinion and contrast it with other
circuits which have dealt with the exclusionary rule in deportation
proceedings.28
The exclusionary rule is a judicially created remedy. It excludes
evidence obtained through an unreasonable search and seizure by a
federal or state government agent in violation of a defendant's
sanctions, United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. at 348, and the rule has thus tradition-
ally applied only where criminal or quasi-criminal sanctions might be imposed. NLRB
v. South Bay Daily Breeze, 415 F.2d 360, 364 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S.
915 (1970). As observed in Janis, "the Court has never applied [the exclusionary rule]
to exclude evidence from a civil proceeding, federal or state." 433 [sic] U.S. at 447.
It is well established that deportation proceedings are civil, not criminal. Woodby
v. INS, 385 U.S. 276, 285 (1966); Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 594-95
(1952); Ramirez v. INS, 550 F.2d 560, 563 (9th Cir. 1977); LeTourneur v. INS, 538 F.2d
1368, 1370 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1044 (1977); Trias-Hernandez v. INS,
528 F.2d 366, 368 (9th Cir. 1975); United States v. Gasca-Kraft, 522 F.2d 149, 152 (9th
Cir. 1975). Since neither criminal procedures nor sanctions are involved in deportation
proceedings, the exclusionary rule is not here appropriate. See NLRB v. South Bay
Daily Breeze, 415 F.2d at 364.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
Section IV of the January 2, 1979 amended opinion reads as follows: Petitioners contend
that the evidence which established their deportability is excludable as the "fruit" of an
illegal search and seizure. Having rejected the contention that a fourth amendment violation
occurred, we do not reach this exclusionary rule issue. 588 F.2d at 1278.
27. Id. On March 2, 1979 at 4:45 P.M. (EST), this writer conducted a telephone interview
with the Honorable Judge Choy of the Ninth Circuit, at the U.S. District Court in Honolulu.
He said that during the months between the slip opinion and the amended opinion, there
was disagreement as to whether the exclusionary rule issue should have been reached in
Cuevas-Ortega. The court finally concluded that the case could be decided without it.
See also Ninth Circuit Recedes From Holding on Exclusionary Rule, 56 Interpreter Releases
(No. 3 Jan. 22, 1979) 24 (American Council for Nationalities Service).
28. The reader should therefore keep in mind that when the "Cuevas-Ortega alternative"
is discussed, it will refer to the exclusionary rule discussion of the slip opinion and not the
amended, final opinion.
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fourth amendment rights.29 The rule was designed to deter unlawful
police conduct and is not considered "a personal constitutional right
of an aggrieved party.""
In Stone v. PoweU1, 31 the Supreme Court reasoned that "despite
the broad deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule, it has never
been interpreted to proscribe the introduction of illegally seized
evidence in all proceedings or against all persons. 32 In Stone, the
defendant, who had killed a liquor store manager's wife, was ar-
rested for violating a vagrancy ordinance.3 3 The policeman who
searched him found a revolver in his possession which was later
shown to be the weapon used in the homicide. The defendant was
convicted of murder .3 Defendant appealed, arguing that the testi-
mony of the policeman who searched him and discovered the re-
volver should have been excluded because the vagrancy ordinance
which had formed the basis for his arrest, was unconstitutional .3
The Court noted that "[t]he. primary justification for the exclu-
sionary rule . . . is the deterence of police conduct that violates
Fourth Amendment rights, ' 31 and found that the public's interest
in determining the truth at trial outweighed the goals to be accom-
plished by applying the exclusionary rule, especially where defen-
dant had been given "full and fair consideration" of his illegal
search and seizure claim at trial and on direct review.3 7
In an earlier case, United States v. Calandra," the Court held that
the rationale for invoking the exclusionary rule was "strongest
where the Government's unlawful conduct would result in the impo-
sition of a criminal sanction on the victim of the search."3 In
Calandra, the defendant argued that a federal agent had exceeded
the scope of a search warrant for bookmaking records when he seized
loansharking materials. Defendant tried to invoke the exclusionary
29. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
30. See Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 174-75 (1969); Cuevas-Ortega, slip op.
at 7.
31. 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
32. Id. at 486 (emphasis added).
33. Id. at 469.
34. Id. at 470.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 486.
37. Id. at 488-95.
38. 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
39. Id. at 348.
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rule in the grand jury proceedings investigating the loansharking
allegations. He also refused to answer grand jury questions, pleading
his fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination.' The Su-
preme Court, in utilizing its balancing approach, refused to apply
the exclusionary rule to grand jury proceedings, noting that in this
particular case the damage done to the grand jury process would be
greater than any benefit derived by the defendant if it did apply the
rule."
The Cuevas-Ortega alternative relied on both Powell and
Calandra.1 It stressed that the exclusionary rule has traditionally
been applied where "criminal or quasi-criminal sanctions" might be
imposed. 3 In short, the exclusionary rule has no place in deporta-
tion proceedings.
The "fruit of he poisonous tree" doctrine is actually a corollary
of the exclusionary rule. It dictates that evidence derived from infor-
mation obtained by an illegal search and seizure is inadmissible.4
Thus, while the exclusionary rule prevents direct use of evidence,
the poisonous fruit doctrine prevents indirect use of evidence. In
other words, unlawfully obtained evidence cannot be used indirectly
to circumvent the exclusionary rule."
In Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States," the Court held
that the evidence obtained indirectly from an unconstitutional
search was tainted by that search and was therefore inadmissible. 7
40. Id. at 341. The court of appeals held that the defendant did have standing to invoke
the exclusionary rule and allowed its application in Grand Jury proceedings.
41. Id. at 350-52. The Court also noted that there are statutory defenses for a grand jury
witness who refuses to answer questions in the event he is held in contempt. Id. at 355 n.1l.
42. Cuevas-Ortega, slip op. at 7.
43. Id. Quasi-criminal sanctions for the purposes of the exclusionary rule were defined in
One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Penn., 380 U.S. 693 (1965). The case involved a state petition
for the forfeiture of a car in which authorities had found 31 cases of liquor. Id. at 694. The
defendant argued that the exclusionary rule applied since the search had been without a
warrant. The state court ruled that a forfeiture proceeding was civil and that the exclusionary
rule therefore did not apply. Id. at 694-95. The Supreme Court held that a forfeiture proceed-
ing "is quasi-criminal in nature." Id. at 700. It defined a quasi-criminal proceeding as one
where "tilts object, like a criminal proceeding, is to penalize for the commission of an offense
against the law." Id.
44. Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 (1975); Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338 (1939);
Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920).
45. See note 44 supra.
46. 251 U.S. 385 (1920).
47. Id. at 390-92. In Silverthorne, while the company officers were arrested and detained
in their homes, a marshal, without any authority, went to the corporate office and took books
and records. The Government later wanted to use information that it derived from the
[Vol. VII
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The doctrine was then extended to unlawful entries and unauthor-
ized arrests in Wong Sun v. United States."8
Poisonous fruit evidence may still be admissible if the Govern-
ment shows that the evidence could have been discovered through
independent inquiry or would inevitably have been discovered with-
out the tainted source." It can also be received if the connection
between the unconstitutional police conduct and the discovery of
the challenged evidence becomes "'so attenuated as to dissipate
the taint.' ,5 There are also cases which hold that the evidence
may be admissible if the Government demonstrates that no pur-
pose of the exclusionary rule, such as deterring unlawful police con-
duct, would be served by the exclusion.5
In addition, a recent Supreme Court decision has narrowed the
application of the poisonous fruit doctrine. In United States v.
Ceccolini, 5 the Court held that the doctrine should be applied with
"greater reluctance" in cases where the evidence derived from the
illegally obtained information is live witness testimony.53 The Court
approved a broader use of the doctrine in cases which seek to sup-
press inanimate objects, such as documentary evidence, which have
been derived from unlawful conduct."4
corporate materials seized to indict the company and officers. The Court refused to allow the
Government to use the information obtained by illegal search and seizure, even though it
could have obtained the corporate documents lawfully. Id.
48. 371 U.S. 471 (1963). In Wong Sun, where an illegal search had taken place, the
defendant was released after arraignment. He later returned voluntarily to make a statement.
The Court held that while contemporaneous admissions, leads, and confessions resulting from
illegal searches could be excluded as poisonous fruit, the link here between the admissions
and the illegal search was sufficiently attenuated to make the defendant's statements
"distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint." Id. at 488.
49. 251 U.S. at 392.
50. 371 U.S. at 487, 491, citing Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939).
51. Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974); United States v. Edmons, 432 F.2d 577 (2d
Cir. 1970).
52. 435 U.S. 268 (1978). In Ceccolini, a police officer noticed an envelope with money lying
on the cash register while talking to the employee of a flower shop. He examined the envelope
and found policy slips. He asked the employee to whom the envelope belonged without
mentioning what he found in it. Id. at 270. Later, Ceccolini, the owner of the envelope was
indicted and the employee testified against him. Ceccolini tried to suppress the employee's
testimony as poisonous fruit evidence from the police officer's illegal search. Id. at 270-71.
The Supreme Court did not find a causal relationship between the unlawful conduct and the
live witness testimony. Id. at 279. In addition, it held live witness testimony to a stricter
standard before it can be labelled poisonous fruit. d. at 280.
53. Id.
54. Id.
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The Ninth Circuit's Cuevas-Ortega alternative would have con-
flicted with the First Circuit on the issue of applying the exclusion-
ary rule to deportation proceedings. The Ninth Circuit, relying on
United States v. Janis55 in its slip opinion, held that the "fruit of
the poisonous tree" doctrine was not applicable in federal or state
civil proceedings. Since a deportation proceeding is a civil action,
it held that the exclusionary rule cannot apply. 7 The First Circuit,
on the other hand, in Wong Chung Che v. INS and Navia-Duran
v. INS," has held that the exclusionary rule can apply to a deporta-
tion hearing.
In Wong Chung Che, two alien crewmen were handcuffed in a
Chinese restaurant and taken to their apartment by INS investiga-
tors. 0 The investigators then entered the apartment without the
aliens' consent and without a warrant.6 During the search of the
apartment, the investigator seized the landing permit of one of the
aliens which at the hearing was introduced as the only evidence of
his deportability.62 The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held
that "[i]f" petitioner's Crewman's Landing Permit was obtained
through an illegal search, there is no authority of which we are aware
that would make it admissible. '63
In Navia-Duran, the illegal alien was arrested without a warrant
and interrogated for four hours in the middle of the night.6 ' She then
gave a statement admitting her illegal presence in the United
States. The form contained a printed recitation of her rights,
"including the right to a deportation hearing" in English. 5 No effort
was made to translate the recitation for the alien, who remained
ignorant of her rights when she signed the statement. The Court
held that although Miranda warnings are not required in deporta-
tion hearings, the INS regulations do provide certain rights of which
an alien must be advised when arrested without a warrant. 6 Failure
55. 428 U.S. 433 (1976).
56. Cuevas-Ortega, slip op. at 7.
57. Id.
58. 565 F.2d 166 (1st Cir. 1977).
59. 568 F.2d 803 (lst Cir. 1977).
60. 565 F.2d at 167.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 168.
63. Id. at 169.
64. 568 F.2d at 805.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 808.
[Vol. VII466
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to advise the arrested alien of these rights rendered Navia-Duran's
statements involuntary. The court held that by failing to comply
with its own regulations, the INS denied the alien due process. 7
Thus, Navia-Duran's statement was excluded from evidence. The
court also took into consideration the coercive atmosphere created
by the "overzealous immigration agent" in applying the exclusion-
ary rule. 8
These two First Circuit cases should not be construed as holding
that a deportation is a criminal proceeding with all the constitu-
tional protections afforded in a criminal setting. While an alien is
entitled to due process and a fair hearing, 9 the First Circuit has
recognized that some of the safeguards required in criminal cases
can be omitted in deportation proceedings.70
Despite the lack of certain specific criminal safeguards, the First
Circuit does not find a justification for admitting evidence obtained
by the Government's unlawful conduct in deportation proceedings.7
The court in Wong Chung Che held that:72
While wide latitude is permitted the government in introducing statements
of arrested suspects, whether or not they might be suppressed in a criminal
proceeding, we can think of not justification by necessity for encouraging
illegal searches of premises. There is no doubt that, if-the landing permit was
obtained through an illegal search, its admission into evidence infected the
deportation proceeding.
Thus, while the First Circuit is consistent with the Ninth Circuit
Cuevas-Ortega alternative in distinguishing deportation proceed-
ings from criminal ones, it is unwilling to overlook the omission of
the exclusionary rule safeguard traditionally available in criminal
proceedings only.
67. Id. at 810.
68. Id.
69. Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33 (1950). See Navia-Duran v. INS, 568 F.2d
at 808, 810 (1st Cir. 1977).
70. Id. at 809. For example, the First Circuit has stated that Miranda warnings are not
required in deportation proceedings. Id. at 808. See Nai Cheng Chen v. INS, 537 F.2d 566,
568 (st Cir. 1976). See also Nason v. INS, 370 F.2d 865, 867 (2d Cir. 1967). The Ninth Circuit
has held that an alien has no right to counsel at a preliminary investigation and that double
jeopardy does not attach in deportation proceedings. Bridges v. Wixon, 144 F.2d 927 (9th
Cir.), rev'd on other grounds, 326 U.S. 135 (1945). The Seventh Circuit has held that a
presumption of innocence does not necessarily exist in deportation proceedings. Chavez-Raya
v. INS, 519 F.2d 397, 401 (7th Cir. 1975).
71. 565 F.2d at 169.
72. Id. (footnote omitted).
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Factual differences per se between the Ninth and First Circuit
cases would not have resolved the conflict. The First Circuit cases
involved illegal arrests and searches. Where it found that a fourth
amendment violation had in fact occurred, the civil nature of the
deportation proceeding did not stop the First Circuit from applying
the exclusionary rule.
In Cuevas-Ortega and in an earlier Ninth Circuit case,73 the illegal
aliens were not arrested or detained and no fourth amendment vio-
lation had occurred. In both cases, the aliens allowed INS agents to
enter their homes and gave statements and documents voluntarily.
Therefore, the exclusionary rule could have no bearing in those
cases. The crux of the conflict with the First Circuit arises because
the Cuevas-Ortega alternative would have held that even if there
had been unlawful conduct, the exclusionary rule would be inapplic-
able to a deportation proceeding, due to its civil nature.74 Thus, had
the Ninth Circuit been faced with the identical fact patterns of the
First Circuit, the Cuevas-Ortega alternative suggests that it could
have taken the opposing viewpoint.75
It is not clear where other circuits stand in this divergence. The
Second Circuit, for example, has not enunciated a clear stand on the
issue. In United States v. Barbera,"' the court stressed the need to
balance an alien's fourth amendment protection from unreasonable
searches and seizures and the "Government's conceded right to pro-
73. Cordon de Ruano v. INS, 554 F.2d 944 (9th Cir. 1977). The petitioner admitted two
INS investigators who were looking for her husband. She answered their questions voluntarily
and gave them her passport which showed her illegal presence in the United States. Id. at
945. At her deportation hearing and on appeal, she tried to suppress the admission of her
passport into evidence claiming that it was illegally seized. Id. at 945-46. The court found
that she had given the passport voluntarily and that no Miranda warnings were necessary
when the INS investigators questioned her. Id. at 946.
74. Cuevas-Ortega, slip op. at 6.
75. The Ninth Circuit did come closer to the First Circuit fact patterns in Hoonsilapa v.
INS, 575 F.2d 735, amended, 586 F.2d 755 (9th Cir. 1978). The court found that INS agents
had illegally arrested the alien and searched his home. 575 F.2d at 738. Using the alien's
name, the INS then learned from its files that the alien was a student from Thailand whose
visa had expired. The alien was found deportable and granted voluntary departure. Id. at 737.
On appeal, he moved to suppress the information from INS files as .'fruit' of an illegal search
and arrest," citing Wong Sun, a First Circuit case. Id. at 737-38. The court found that the
discovery of the alien's name during the unlawful INS conduct did not taint the information
that the INS subsequently got from its files. The information came from independent and
voluntary sources and was therefore admissible. Id. at 738. The court did not go on to discuss
the exclusionary rule issue already defined by the circuit.
76. 514 F.2d 294 (2d Cir. 1975).
[Vol. VII
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tect the integrity of its borders."" The appellee was travelling on a
bus which had crossed into New York from Canada when he was
questioned by a "roving patrol". He failed to answer questions
about his citizenship and was detained by a border patrol agent. 7'
Appellee moved to suppress the evidence, claiming that the seizure
was not a proper border search. His motion was granted by the
district court and the Government appealed."9 The Second Circuit
affirmed the district court. 0 While the court recognized the problem
created by illegal immigration, it stressed the need to protect the
alien's fourth amendment rights.8 The court said that "to respond
to the problem by watering down the probable cause requirements
of the Fourth Amendment is most surely to take the lowest constitu-
tional road." 2
Moving from the general climate created by the court in Barbera,
there has been little effort by the Second Circuit to deal more specif-
ically with the exclusionary rule and its application to deportation
proceedings. One such effort occurred in Melara-Esquivel v. INS.83
In this case, the alien was arrested. At his deportation hearing, he
gave his name and the Government produced a pre-existing file
under that name." The court said that because the evidence was
available from an independent and untainted source, it was unnec-
essary to consider the INS' "alternative argument that the exclu-
sionary rule does not apply to deportation proceedings. '"" Finally,
in a recent decision, Hincapie-Duque v. INS,8 an alien was arrested
by INS agents in the garage where he worked as a result of an
anonymous phone call to the INS mentioning the alien's illegal
presence in the United States.87 The alien challenged the search of
the premises where he was apprehended and the constitutionality
77. Id. at 301.
78. Id. at 296.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id at 301.
82. Id. at 301-02.
83. No. 76-4111, slip op.(2d Cir. Oct. 13, 1976) [hereinafter cited as Melara-Esquivel, slip
op.!.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. No. 78-4015, slip op.(2d Cir. June 20, 1978) [hereinafter cited as Hincapie-Duque, slip
op.!.
87. id.
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of his initial interrogation.8 The Government, in reply, argued that
there had been no unlawful conduct and that the evidence was
therefore untainted. 9 Citing the Cuevas-Ortega slip opinion,9 0 the
Government also argued at length that the exclusionary rule did not
apply to deportation proceedings." The petition to review Hincapie-
Duque's deportation order was denied by the Second Circuit sum-
marily, without indicating a stand on the exclusionary rule issue.
In the Third Circuit, a recent district court decision has indi-
cated, in dicta, a movement toward the Cuevas-Ortega alternative.
In Smith v. Morris"3 the aliens were arrested without a warrant. At
the deportation hearing, in order to avoid adverse inferences from
remaining silent, the aliens admitted that they had overstayed the
time authorized by their visitor's permits. The Government did
produce copies of those permits which had been seized at the time
of the arrest, but withdrew them. When a deportation order was
entered by the immigration judge, the aliens applied to the district
court for a writ of habeas corpus. 5 The court denied the petitions
holding that the admissions of the aliens at the deportation hearing
provided sufficient basis for the deportation order and noted that
no illegally-seized evidence had actually been introduced by the
Government. The court, in dicta, went on to add that a deporta-
tion proceeding is not a criminal proceeding:97
In deportation hearings, the issues are merely identity and status; the conse-
quences are not penal in nature; and the ultimate outcome cannot possibly
be tainted by earlier unlawful actions of INS agents. That is to say, applica-
tion of the exclusionary rule could not have any significant impact on the
result of a deportation proceeding.
The court further reasoned that the fourth amendment is fully ap-
plicable in a criminal proceeding where the decision results from
the occurrence of specific events and not merely upon proof of an
alien's status. The court stated:
88. Id.
89. Brief for Respondent at 11-14, Hincapie-Duque v. INS, No.78-4015, slip op. (2d Cir.
June 20, 1978).
90. Id. at 14 n.12, 25.
91. Id. at 15-28.
92. Hincapie-Duque, slip op.
93. 442 F. Supp. 712 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
94. Id. at 714.
95. Id. at 713.
96. Id. at 714.
97. Id.
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Therefore, assuming the Fourth Amendment is fully applicable to the activi-
ties of INS agents, and assuming that aliens are entitled to full protection
afforded by the Fourth Amendment, it would nevertheless seem that the
exclusionary rule serves no useful purpose in any deportation proceeding in
which the decision does not depend on proof of specific events, but merely
on proof of status.M
The Third Circuit has done little since Morris to clarify its posi-
tion on the use of the exclusionary rule in deportation proceedings.
In a recent Court of Appeals decision, Lee v. INS," a Chinese crew-
man was stopped and interrogated by INS agents. Lee admitted
that he had deserted his ship and gave the INS agent his crewman's
landing permit.'" At his deportation proceeding, Lee was found
deportable but was allowed voluntary departure. Lee appealed,
claiming that the interrogation and arrest were not based on proba-
ble cause and were therefore illegal. He then requested the applica-
tion'of the exclusionary rule to suppress the evidence against him.""
The court discussed reasonable suspicion and probable cause justifi-
cations as they apply to forcible detention by INS agents. 02 It then
concluded that the INS agent had met the necessary standards and
that Lee's detention was legal. Therefore the evidence flowing from
the detention was admissible. 0 3
The Lee court found it unnecessary to consider the exclusionary
rule arguments raised by the parties since it had decided that none
of the evidence before it had been illegally obtained. 104 It also dec-
lined to decide whether information from INS files was derived from
an illegal detention and thus excludible under the poisonous fruit
doctrine. 05 Therefore, by expressly stating that it would not address
these issues, the Third Circuit has indicated that it is not ready to
commit itself formally to a particular viewpoint. The Lee court even
went a step further by amending its original slip opinion, deleting
all references to the divergent First and Ninth Circuit holdings on
the issue.'"1
98. Id.
99. No. 77-2265 (3d Cir. Jan. 4, 1979).
100. Id. at 3-4.
101. Id. at 5.
102. Id. at 5-11.
103. Id. at 11.
104. Id. at 12.
105. Id.
106. The court acknowledged the exclusionary rule issues in its opinion but declined to
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The amending of opinions to exclude the exclusionary rule issue
by the Ninth and Third Circuits does not diminish the Cuevas-
Ortega alternative as a reasonable choice. However, the courts' re-
luctance to allow its views in the slip opinions to stand naturally
lends more credence to the clear and firm First Circuit point of view.
Although many of the circuits have yet to comment, the resolu-
tion of the exclusionary rule issue in deportation proceedings could
have several important effects.
If the First Circuit holding prevails and the exclusionary rule is
applied, the Supreme Court's recent decision in Ceccolini'07 will
become an important factor in the conduct of deportation proceed-
ings. Documentary evidence such as passports and permits could be
excluded from evidence if obtained by an illegal search and seizure.
Since such documents constitute a major part of the Government's
case in deportation proceedings, the Government's position would
inevitably be severely handicapped.
The Ceccolini decision could even be taken a step further. If the
documentary evidence used by the Government to show deportabil-
ity has been derived through information obtained by an unconsti-
tutional search and seizure, it could be excluded as "fruit of the
poisonous tree". Thus pre-existing Government documents, such as
INS records, would become inadmissible in a deportation proceed-
ing if unlawful INS conduct is involved. Under Ceecolini, a witness'
live testimony might not be excluded because "the illegality which
led to the discovery of the witness very often will not play any
meaningful part in the witness' willingness to testify."0 8
On the other hand, if the Cuevas-Ortega alternative were to pre-
vail, the Ceccolini distinction between witness testimony and docu-
mentary evidence would have no effect in deportation proceedings
since the court would refuse to exclude either despite an argument
that it had been derived from unlawful INS conduct.
The adoption of the First Circuit view would also effect the con-
duct of INS investigators. In searches for and encounters with illegal
address them further. The original opinion, dated Jan. 4, 1979, also cited the divergent First
and Ninth Circuit cases dealing with the subject (including the Cuevas-Ortega slip opinion)
without indicating a Third Circuit position. Id. Curiously, on Jan. 25, 1979, an order was
entered amending only the exclusionary rule area of the opinion, deleting the cites com-
pletely. No. 77-2265 (3d Cir. Jan. 25, 1979).
107. 435 U.S. 268 (1978).
108. Id. at 277.
[Vol. VII
CASE NOTE
aliens, the .weight of the exclusionary rule would encourage INS
agents to act more cautiously to prevent possible fourth amendment
violations. Such awareness and prudence would protect any evi-
dence found from being tainted and eliminate the Government's
burden of finding similar evidence from a wholly independent
source. It would also serve as a reminder to overzealous investiga-
tors, such as the one in Navia-Duran, 01 that even illegal aliens have
certain rights which must be protected.
Another effect of resolving the exclusionary rule issue would be on
the illegal alien himself. When the INS discovers the illegal alien's
presence, deportation proceedings are instituted against him. If a
deportation order is entered, the illegal alien has few alternatives
remaining that can prevent his actual departure. The exclusionary
rule, if permitted in deportation proceedings, could be important
legal remedy for the deportable illegal alien.
The final and most dramatic effect of the exclusionary rule issue
is that the rule could be an important legal defense for any deporta-
ble alien. Its application could be crucial, not only to illegal aliens,
but permanent resident aliens who have lived in the United States
for years and have established themselves in the community, as well
as other lawfully-admitted aliens against whom deportation pro-
ceedings are instituted.
A recent Ninth Circuit decision, Larios-Mendez v. INS, ' sug-
gested that the exclusionary rule issue is an important defense to
lawfully-admitted aliens who subsequently become deportable
under 8 U.S.C. § 1251 (a)."' In Larios-Mendez, the petitioner was a
permanent resident alien. He was caught smuggling two illegal
aliens into the United States by an Arizona border patrol. He
pleaded guilty and was sentenced by a U.S. Magistrate for "aiding
and abetting the illegal entry of aliens into the United States" in
109. 568 F.2d at 810. For another example of "overzealousness," see Bong Youn Choy v.
Barber, 279 F.2d 642 (9th Cir. 1960) where a well-educated Chinese alien, who reported
voluntarily to the INS office, was interrogated for hours and threatened with deportation and
perjury prosecution unless he admitted to being a Communist. After a. sleepless night, he
returned and signed such a confession. Id. at 643-45. The INS then found him deportable.
Id. at 645. The Ninth Circuit reversed his deportation order finding that the underlying
confession was coerced. Id. at 647. See also Valeros v. INS, 387 F.2d 921 (7th Cir. 1969).
110. No. 76-2362 (9th Cir. Jan. 5, 1979).
111. Section 1251(a) of Title 8 of the United States Code lists reasons for finding an alien,
who is in the United States, deportable. 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1976).
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violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1325. After the criminal case, the INS in-
stituted deportation proceedings against Larios-Mendez, charging
deportability under 8 U.S.C. § 1251 (a)(13), the smuggling provi-
sion.112 At his deportation hearing, Larios-Mendez contended that
the statements of the illegal aliens were necessary to show he had
helped them enter the United States for a price. He argued that
such statements were inadmissible because the stop by the border
patrol violated the fourth amendment. The court found enough
evidence apart from the challenged statements to support the de-
portation order and affirmed it "without considering whether the
statements in question were the fruits of an illegal stop or arrest or
whether the exclusionary rule of the fourth amendment should be
applied in the civil proceeding to suppress relevant evidence."' 3
Although the appeal did not succeed, the use of the exclusionary
rule argument by the petitioner in Larios-Mendez raises interesting
questions in extending the issue past illegal alien cases. If there had
not been enough additional evidence allowing the court to evade the
exclusionary rule issue, would the Larios-Mendez court have elected
the Cuevas-Ortega alternative or the First Circuit view? Although
not within 'the scope of this Casenote, should a legally-admitted
alien be given greater exclusionary rule access than an illegal alien?
Or will the deportation proceeding's civil nature give the permanent
resident alien, who has roots in America, the same odds as the illegal
alien vis-a-vis the exclusionary rule? Finally, if the issue is raised
often enough by these "legal" aliens who become deportable, will
the circuits or ultimately the Supreme Court move more quickly to
resolve it?
Other frequently used methods of preventing physical departure
after entry of a deportation order have not been very effective. The
argument that the immigration judge abused his discretion in deny-
ing the alien voluntary departure is routinely raised in petitions to
112. Section 1251(a)(13) provides:
Any alien in the United States (including an alien crewman) shall, upon order of the
Attorney General, be deported who-
(13) prior to, or at the time of any entry or at any time within five years after any entry,
shall have, knowingly and for gain, encouraged, induced, assisted, abetted, or aided
any other alien to enter or to try to enter the United States in violation of the law.
8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(13) (1976).
113. No. 76-2362 (9th Cir. Jan. 5, 1979).
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review deportation orders. It rarely succeeds in appellate courts
unless it can be shown that the discretion was exercised arbitrarily
and capriciously."'
The tactic of delaying departure where "there is not even a color-
able legal or factual basis for relief sought"" 5 has been attacked in
a recent Second Circuit decision."' Attorneys frequently use peti-
tions for writs of habeas corpus and appeals of INS decisions to stall
the deportable alien's physical departure from the United States. In
Der-Rong Chour v. INS,"7 the Second Circuit not only affirmed the
deportation order, but assessed "damages in the sum of $1,000 and
double costs" against the alien and his attorney.""
Thus, use of the exclusionary rule in deportation proceedings
where there is a question of unlawful INS conduct, could be one of
the more viable routes for the deportable alien. The First Circuit
view of the exclusionary rule would expand his possible defenses in
a deportation hearing. Even though he is in the United States ille-
gally, evidence of his deportability would be suppressed if unconsti-
tutionally obtained. The Ninth Circuit Cuevas-Ortega alternative
would reduce his defenses, allowing the Government to introduce
any evidence of deportability, no matter how it was obtained. Ulti-
mately, to the deportable alien, the applicability of the exclusionary
rule to his case could mean the difference between continuing to live
in America and returning abroad.
Diane M. Peress
114. 588 F.2d at 1278. See also Hincapie-Duque, slip op.; Melara-Esquivel, slip op.
115. Der-Rong Chour v. INS, 578 F.2d 464, 468 (2d Cir. 1978).
116. 578 F.2d 464. Here, a Chinese crewman failed to depart after his stay was extended.
He then absconded and was arrested. He then tried to delay his departure by filing various
petitions. Id. at 465-67. The court found this to be "an outrageous abuse of the civil process
through persistent pursuit of frivolous and completely meritless claims." Id. at 467.
117. Id. at 464.
118. Id. at 468-69.
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